We exploit the time-series variation in the cross-section of stock returns to identify the impact of political cycles on stock returns through the government spending channel. Using a novel measure of industry exposure to government spending, we document that during Democratic presidencies, firms with high exposure to government spending significantly outperform firms with low exposure. The reverse holds true during Republican presidencies. In addition, the presidential stock market puzzle in Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) is more concentrated in industries with high exposure to government spending. Exposure to standard risk factors, business cycle effects, firm characteristics, and persistent, in-sample, cash flow shocks do not account for the cross-sectional pattern in returns across presidential terms. This evidence suggests that differences in returns can be attributed to the market being systematically positively (negatively) surprised by Democratic (Republican) government spending policies. A long-short cross-sectional investment strategy that exploits the presidential partisan cycle predictability generates abnormal returns as large as 7% per annum. *
Introduction
The annual average value-weighted excess return in the U.S. stock market is about nine percentage points higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) dub this empirical finding the presidential stock market puzzle because this difference in returns is not explained by differences in the riskiness of the stock market across presidencies. The large economic magnitude of this puzzle deserves a better understanding of its potential sources. The political cycle may affect stock returns through different fiscal and regulatory policies. According to a "partisan" view of political cycles as in Alesina (1987) , Republicans and Democrats may differ in policies related to taxes, government spending and social benefits. In this paper, we focus on one important economic mechanism through which the presidential partisan cycle may affect stock returns, namely government spending.
Consumption and investment spending by the government sector represents about 20% of annual gross domestic product, and thus it is likely to have a non-negligible impact on asset prices.
The properties of government spending should vary with the presidential partisan cycle due to differences in the economic policies of Democrats and Republicans. However, the limited time span and frequency of available noisy data on government spending makes it statistically challenging to identify directly differences across political cycles. Hence, to identify the impact of political cycles on stock returns through the government spending channel we use information from a large cross-section of U.S. publicly traded firms. We compare the stock market performance of firms in industries with different exposure to government spending and investigate whether their performance varies with the political cycle. The focus on the cross-section is motivated by the fact that variation in government spending is likely to affect firms with different exposure to government spending differently, ceteris paribus. As documented in Ramey and Shapiro (1998) , for example, the increase in government spending on manufactured goods during military buildup tends to be concentrated on a relatively small number of industries. In addition, the government sector is the primary buyer of the goods from these industries and thus their performance is closely linked to the spending de-cisions of the government sector. Therefore, if government spending has a significant impact on asset prices, it can be identified by the differential performance of firms in industries with different exposure to government spending. Furthermore, if the presidential partisan cycle affects stock returns through the government spending channel, it should be reflected in the differential performance of these industries across the presidential cycle.
To implement this identification approach, we construct a novel measure of industry exposure to government spending using detailed industry level data from the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts released by the Bureau of Economic Analysis. This measure is defined as the proportion of each industry's total output being purchased by the government sector accounting for multiplier effects. To investigate the link between stock returns, industry exposure to government spending and the presidential partisan cycle, we then create five portfolios sorted on industry exposure to government spending and study the properties of their excess returns across presidential terms.
The portfolio approach and our sorting procedure is a convenient way to investigate our research question. This approach reduces the impact of other industry effects, thus making differences in average returns across portfolios more reliably linked to differences in industry exposure to government spending.
1 In addition, the formation of these portfolios does not require any estimation, and the cash-flows of firms in the portfolios are economically rather than statistically linked to government spending. To ensure that these portfolios constitute a tradable investment strategy, the portfolios are sorted based on information from the InputOutput Accounts publicly available at the time of portfolio formation. The data availability from the Input-Output Accounts along with the tradable strategy requirement restrict our sample from July 1955 to December 2009. This sample covers six Democratic and nine
Republican presidential terms.
Our main empirical findings can be summarized as follows. First, the size of presidential stock market puzzle increases monotonically with the level of industry exposure to govern-1 Our motivation for sorting portfolios based on industry exposure to government spending follows Gomes, Kogan, and Yogo (2009) , who argue that industry portfolios should be sorted along the dimension of economic interest -in their study, the durability of output. ment spending and is significantly more concentrated in industries with high exposure to government spending. The annual average excess stock return of firms in industries with high government exposure is about 13.4 percentage points higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies. For firms in industries with low government exposure this difference is considerably smaller, only 2.5 percentage points, and is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Second, firms in industries with high government exposure significantly outperform firms in industries with low exposure by about 6.2 percentage points during Democratic presidencies. During Republican presidential terms, this relative performance is reversed: firms in industries with high government exposure significantly underperform firms in industries with low government exposure by about −4.8 percentage points. These results hold even after controlling for firm-level characteristics including market capitalization, book-tomarket and firm momentum. These findings suggest that government spending represents an empirically plausible economic channel through which the presidential partisan cycle may affect stock returns.
Since the presidential partisan cycle might be proxying for the business cycle, we examine its relationship with portfolios' excess returns after controlling for business cycle variables known to forecast stock returns. We show that the presidential partisan cycle indeed captures variation in returns that is largely uncorrelated with business cycle fluctuations.
We then investigate whether the difference in average realized returns of the government exposure portfolios across presidential terms is due to a difference in expected returns or a difference in unexpected returns. In the first case, the difference in realized returns would be attributable to a difference in risk-premia. In the latter case, the difference in realized returns would be driven by systematic surprises in government spending of the party in the presidency. We decompose the time-series of realized returns of the government exposure portfolios into expected and unexpected returns using a multifactor conditional asset pricing model. Following the work of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) , the asset pricing model includes the stock market, size, value and momentum factors as proxies for systematic risk, and allows for business cycle variation in both the factor risk prices and the quantity of risk of each portfolio. We find that the large difference in the returns of the government exposure portfolios across presidential partisan cycles is mostly unexpected by the market. During Democratic presidencies, firms with high government exposure are expected to outperform firms with low government exposure by about 2 percentage points, but the difference in average realized returns is much higher in the data, 6 percentage points.
More strikingly, during Republican presidencies, firms with high government exposure are expected to outperform firms with low government exposure by about 1 percentage points, in contrast with the strong underperformance of about −5 percentage points observed in the data. This evidence suggests that the difference in realized returns can be attributed to the market being systematically positively surprised by the properties of government spending in Democratic presidencies and negatively surprised by the properties of government spending in Republican presidencies. Since we do not know for sure what drives risk premia, i.e. the true equilibrium asset pricing model, we cannot rule out completely the possibility that the pattern in average returns corresponds to compensation for risk. Nonetheless, the empirical evidence suggests that differences in returns cannot be explained by exposure to the traditional risk factors.
We further examine the concentration of realized returns of the government portfolios within presidential terms. We find that firms with high government exposure systematically underperform firms with low government exposure over the second year of Republican presidencies, while they significantly outperform over the second and third year of Democratic presidencies. If the difference in returns was due to a higher ex-ante risk premium, realized returns should have been more concentrated earlier on during the term of the presidency, when political uncertainty is resolved. This evidence further suggests that the difference in returns is not anticipated by the market and is largely due to systematic surprises in the government spending policies of Democrats and Republicans.
A possible explanation for these patterns in average returns of the government exposure portfolios across presidential partisan cycles is that we are documenting differences in unexpected returns arising from persistent, in-sample cash flow shocks: these shocks may be correlated with exposure to government spending across presidential cycles in-sample, but are unlikely to persist in the future. Hence we examine the relation between profitability, exposure to government spending and stock returns over presidential partisan cycles. While negative abnormal profitability is in line with the pattern in returns during Republican presidencies, it is not consistent with the pattern in returns during Democratic ones. Hence, not only unexpected profitability fails to account for our findings across Democratic presidencies, it seems to work in the opposite direction. This suggests that we may be understating the true relation between government exposure and expected returns during Democratic presidencies.
Finally, we exploit the empirical link between stock returns, industry exposure to government spending, and the presidential partisan cycle to construct a tradeable self-financing investment strategy. During Democratic presidencies, the strategy is long on industries with high government exposure and short on industries with low government exposure. During Republican presidencies, these long and short positions are reversed. We show that this investment strategy produces high average value-weighted excess returns of about 5% per annum. Consistent with the previous analysis, the large returns of this investment strategy cannot be explained by risk exposure to standard risk factors including the stock market, size, value and momentum factors. The abnormal returns associated with this investment strategy range from 3% to 7% per annum depending on the benchmark equilibrium asset pricing model. Furthermore, the composition of the portfolios and the frequency of trading characterizing this investment strategy -i.e. trading of industry portfolios only every five years -make it unlikely that trading and other transaction costs may cancel out the large abnormal returns.
Related Literature
The findings in this paper are related to the empirical asset pricing literature exploring the effect of firm or industry characteristics on the cross-section of stock returns.
2 Building on the presidential stock market puzzle in Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) , we document an heterogeneous impact of the presidential partisan cycle on the cross-section of stock returns and show that the puzzle is more concentrated in industries with high exposure to government spending.
Relatively few papers have studied the relationship between government spending and asset prices. Pastor and Veronesi (2010) investigate theoretically the impact of uncertainty in government policy on asset prices and Boutchkova, Doshi, Durnev, and Molchanov (2010) investigate empirically the impact of political uncertainty on return volatility. Tavares and Valkanov (2003) provide VAR-based empirical evidence of the impact of government spending on asset returns. In our analysis, we exploit cross-sectional variation in average returns across portfolios sorted on an ex-ante measure of industry exposure to government spending to shed further light on this relationship. Moreover, the time-series analysis of such cross-sectional heterogeneity in average returns allows us to investigate the impact of political cycles on asset prices through the government spending channel. Hence, this paper also contributes to a large empirical literature on the effects of political cycles on the macroeconomy.
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The identification strategy in this paper contributes to a large literature in macroeconomics that studies the effect of government spending on macroeconomic variables. The classic approach in this literature is to fit VARs to macroeconomic data in order to identify government spending shocks. 4 However, as discussed in Ramey (2009), the limited time span and frequency of available, highly persistent, noisy government data makes statistical inference challenging. Hence, the development of alternative identification strategies focusing on periods of significant "exogenous" expansion in US defense spending. 5 More recently, Cohen, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) , Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) , Loughran and Ritter (1995) , Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (1995), Piotroski (2000) , and Fama and French (2006) . Papers documenting a relationship between industry characteristics and average stock returns include Hou and Robinson (2006) and Gomes, Kogan, and Yogo (2009) . 3 For surveys in this area, see Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997), and Drazen (2000) . More recently, Snowberg, Wolfers, and Zitzewitz (2007) provide prediction market based evidence of partisan impacts on economic activity, and Julio and Yook (2010) document the impact of political uncertainty on corporate investments.
4 See Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) , Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Ramey (2009) .
5 See Ramey and Shapiro (1998), Edelberg, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (1999) , and Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Fisher (2004) .
Coval, and Malloy (2010) use changes in congressional committee chairmanship as a source of exogenous variation in state-level federal expenditures to identify the impact of government spending on the private sector economic activity. By comparing the performance of industries with ex-ante different exposure to government spending, we provide an alternative identification procedure to examine the effect of government spending on the economy.
Finally, this paper is related to a growing empirical literature investigating the impact of various forms of political connectedness on firm value. Connectedness measured by the existence of explicit relationships between firms and politicians appears to affect firm value. Faccio (2006) documents that firm value increases on average by about 2% at the announcement of an officer or large shareholder entering politics. Faccio and Parsley (2007) provide evidence of an average 2% decline in the market value of firms connected to legislators who unexpectedly die. Faccio, Masulis, and McConnell (2006) find that the likelihood of government bailouts of financially distressed firms increases for firms with a top company officer or a large shareholder in an important government position. Connectedness measured by firm contributions to politicians also appears to matter for firm value as documented in the event-study analysis of Goldman, Rocholl, and So (2009) . More recently, Cooper, Gulen, and Ovtchinnikov (2010) construct firm-specific year-by-year connectedness measures and provide full-sample evidence of a strong positive relation between measures of corporate political contributions and the cross-section of future returns. In our analysis, we document that economic measures of political connectedness such as a firm's exposure to government spending affect the cross-section of stock returns over presidential partisan cycles, thus complementing and reinforcing the findings in this literature.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in our empirical analysis including the construction of a novel measure of industry exposure to government spending. Section 3 presents the main empirical results on the relationship between firms' exposure to government spending and average excess stock returns, and how this relationship varies with presidential partisan cycles. Section 4 establishes that the difference in average returns across presidential partisan cycles is largely unexpected by investors. Section 5 investigates if our findings are driven by persistent, in-sample cash-flow shocks. Section 6 examines the risk and return properties of an investment strategy based on the presidential partisan cycle.
Finally, Section 7 concludes. Further details on the data description and the construction of the measure of industry exposure to government spending are provided in the Appendix.
Data
In this section, we explain the construction of the measure of industry exposure to government spending and describe the data used in the empirical analysis.
Industry Exposure to Government Spending
We measure the industry exposure to government spending at the three-digit standard industry classification (SIC) level using data from the Benchmark Input-Output Accounts released by Bureau of Economic Analysis. This dataset is useful for our purposes because it provides highly disaggregated industry level information about the flow of goods among industries and, more importantly, the flow of goods from each industry to its final uses, such as government consumption, government investment, private consumption and private investment. We identify the level of industry exposure to government spending as the proportion of the industry's total output being purchased by the government sector for final use. In computing this ratio, the total amount of the industry output being purchased by the government sector takes into account both direct and indirect (or multiplier) effects. The direct effect measures the fact that one additional dollar of goods purchased by the government sector in, for example, the agriculture industry, directly represents one additional dollar of sales in that industry. However, in order to generate this additional sale, the agriculture industry requires intermediate inputs from other industries to produce its output, thus increasing demand (and hence output) in these industries as well. The chain of input-output relationships among industries thus gives rise to an indirect government spending effect -i.e. the multiplier effect-, which we compute using the Leontief inverse, that is widely used in standard Input-Output analysis.
6 Accounting for both effects is naturally important to fully characterize each industry real exposure to government spending. Appendix A-1 provides a detailed explanation of the procedure.
The data from the Input-Output tables is available from 1947 to 2002, thus covering a relatively large number of presidential terms. The Input-Output accounts are available for the years 1947, 1958, 1963, 1967 and, after 1967, all Thus our sample covers six Democratic and nine Republican presidential terms.
[Insert Table 1 Here]
Panel A in Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the measure of industry exposure to government spending. The average across all years is about 13% and its cross-sectional distribution is fairly stable across Democratic and Republican presidencies. More than 90% of the industries have sales to the government sector that represent less than 30% of the industry's total sales. Hence, the mass of the government exposure distribution is concentrated at low values, which reflects the fact that most of the final demand in the U.S. economy is from the private sector (private consumption and investment) rather than from the government sector. However, the high values (max) of industry exposure to government spending also make clear that some industries rely heavily on the government sector as a final consumer. Table   2 lists the top five industries with highest and lowest exposure to government spending in 6 See, for example, ten Raa (2006).
our sample. 7 Industries with the highest exposure to government spending include aircraft, defense, shipbuilding and railroad equipment, electronic equipment and construction. The five industries with the lowest exposure to government spending include industries closely related to private consumption such as tobacco products, candy and soda, beer and liquor, apparel and food products.
[Insert Table 2 Here]
Financial and Macroeconomic Variables
Monthly stock returns are from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) and firm level accounting information is from the CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged Annual Industrial
Files. To be included in our sample, a firm must have monthly stock return, SIC code, and market capitalization (size). In addition, as standard in the asset pricing literature, we remove firms in the utility sector (SIC codes between 4900 and 4940) since these industries are heavily regulated, and firms in the financial sector (SIC codes between 6000 and 7900).
We use the three-digit SIC code to identify an industry. We use COMPUSTAT historical SIC codes, if not missing, because they are more accurate (see Kahle and Walkling (1998) ).
If COMPUSTAT historical SIC code is missing, we use the corresponding CRSP SIC codes.
Appendix A-2 provides a detailed description of the additional CRSP and COMPUSTAT data used in the empirical analysis as well as the additional sample selection criteria.
Panel B in Table 1 reports the summary statistics of value-weighted aggregate stock market excess returns across all years in the sample period, and across Democratic and Republican presidential terms. Consistent with the results documented in Santa-Clara and
Valkanov (2003) for the period between 1927 to 1998, the average aggregate stock market excess return is considerably higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies in our sample period as well, 15.3% and 7.7% per annum, respectively. Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) show that such a large difference in average returns is robust to careful treatments of outliers and small sample bias issues.
To interpret the relationship between presidential partisan cycles and stock returns, it is important to understand the correlation between presidential partisan cycles and the business cycles as well. Panel B in Table 1 also reports the summary statistics of per capita gross domestic product (GDP) growth as well as per capita government consumption and investment spending growth. The macroeconomic aggregate data is from the National Income Product Accounts available through the Bureau of Economic Analysis website. Consistent with the evidence in Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and Alesina, Roubini, and Cohen (1997) ,
annual GDP growth is on average higher under Democratic than Republican presidential terms, 2.5% and 1.6%, respectively. Similarly, total annual government spending growth is on average higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies, 1.5% and 0.6%, respectively. However, the limited sample size of the available noisy data on government spending makes this difference statistically insignificant at conventional levels. Similarly, a
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the null hypothesis that Democratic and Republican government spending are drawn from the same distribution at any conventional level.
More generally, the limited data available makes statistically challenging to identify directly differences in government spending across presidential partisan cycles.
3 Exposure to Government Spending and the Cross-
Section of Stock Returns
In this section we establish our main empirical findings. Conditional on the presidential partisan cycle, firms' exposure to government spending predicts the cross-section of stock returns. The predictability is stronger during Democratic presidencies and holds even after controlling for other firm characteristics known to predict stock returns and for business cycle effects.
Government Exposure Portfolios
To investigate the link between exposure to government spending, presidential partisan cycles and stock returns we form five portfolios sorted on the level of industry exposure to government spending. We define these portfolios as the government exposure portfolios.
This portfolio approach and sorting procedure is a convenient way to investigate our research question. By construction, these portfolios maximize the spread in the industry exposure to government spending and thus differences in their average returns can be more accurately attributed to differences in the sorting variable. The portfolio approach also reduces the impact on average returns of other industry effects, which are not the focus of our analysis. The sorting on an ex-ante measure of industry exposure to government spending differs from the more conventional procedure of creating portfolios sorted on pre-ranked government spending betas (e.g. Breeden, Gibbons, and Litzenberger (1989) , and Lamont (2001)) since it does not require any estimation. Thus, the cash-flows of the industries in the portfolios are economically (and not only statistically) linked to government spending.
In addition, the estimation of government spending betas would require high frequency government spending data, but the limited time span, the high level of aggregation and the poor quality of the available government spending data makes this approach less feasible in practice.
In constructing the five government exposure portfolios we follow the methodology in Fama and French (1993) . In each June of year t, we first sort the universe of common stocks into five portfolios based on the industry exposure to government spending. The cutoffs used for the portfolio formation are the quintiles of the industry exposure to government spending at the end of year t − 1. Once the portfolios are formed, their value-weighted returns are tracked from July of year t to June of year t + 1. 8 The portfolios are rebalanced annually.
Because of the updates in the Input-Output Accounts (approximately every five years), some industries move across government exposure portfolios. The transition frequencies are given in Table 3 . Importantly, the government exposure portfolios are very stable, and thus the investment strategies investigated here are likely to have low turnover costs.
9
[Insert Table 3 Here]
Panel A in Table 4 reports the summary statistics of selected firm characteristics of the five government exposure portfolios across all years (654 months). Importantly, the spread in the level of exposure to government spending across the extreme portfolios is high, with the difference being more modest across the intermediate portfolios. The average industry exposure to government spending of the low and high government portfolios are around 1.5%
and 29.6%, respectively. Hence, for industries with high government exposure, more than a quarter of their total sales is generated from government demand. For the intermediate portfolios, the difference ranges from 4.8% (portfolio 2) to 14.7% (portfolio 4). This relatively smaller difference reflects the fact that the cross-sectional distribution of industry exposure to government spending is highly concentrated at low values as reported in Panel A of Table 1 . Each government portfolio represents on average an approximately equal number of industries. While portfolios with low government exposure tend to have relatively higher book-to-market ratios, there are no significant differences in firm size across the government exposure portfolios. Firm profitability (as measured by the earnings-to-assets ratio) tends to be slightly higher in firms with low exposure to government spending than in firms with high exposure, but the relationship is not monotone across portfolios.
[Insert Table 4 Here]
Returns of the Government Exposure Portfolios Across Presidencies
We report our main empirical findings in 1977 and Clinton 1993 -1997 , the high minus low government exposure portfolio average annual returns are greater than 10%. The pattern of average returns across Republican presidential terms is equally impressive, except for the Eisenhower presidency in 1955-1957. 10 The average return of the spread portfolio is negative in six out of the eight Republican presidential terms, consistently with the summary statistics in Table 4 .
[Insert Figure 1 Here]
The pattern in average excess returns reported in difference is small and statistically insignificant, 8.64% versus 6.17%, respectively. More generally, the difference in the average realized returns of the government portfolios across presidential terms increases monotonically with the industry exposure to government spending. These empirical findings suggest that government spending is a plausible economic channel through which the party in the presidency can affect stock returns.
Firm Characteristics and Business Cycle Effects
To identify the marginal predictive power of the government exposure variable in the crosssection of stock returns, we run standard Fama and MacBeth (1973) regressions of firmlevel monthly stock returns on firms' exposure to government spending and other firmlevel characteristics. In addition, we investigate whether the heterogenous impact of the presidential partisan cycle on stock returns can be simply attributed to a political cycle effect on stock returns or whether it is simply proxying for variations in returns due to business cycle fluctuations. spending. In the second specification, we control for other known stock return predictors including firm market capitalization (size), book-to-market ratio (B/M) and momentum characteristics (mom).
Firm-Level Fama-MacBeth Regressions
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[Insert Table 5 Here] 11 The choice of firm level characteristic is based on the empirical findings of Banz (1981) , Rosenberg, Reid, and Lanstein (1985) , Fama and French (1992) , and Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) .
The industry exposure to government spending contains information about future stock returns beyond the information in other firm characteristics. Panel A shows that the slope coefficient for the government exposure variable is negative during Republican presidential terms, consistently with the portfolio findings reported in Table 4 . However, the slope coefficient is not statistically significant at conventional levels in any specification. During Democratic years (Panel B), the slope coefficient for the government exposure variable is positive, and both economically and statistically significant, even after controlling for other firm characteristics. A one standard deviation increase in the exposure to government spending (about 11.2 percentage points) increases on average a firm annual excess return by about 2.31 percentage points (row 4, with controls) or 3.05% (row 3, without controls) per annum.
A Business Cycle or a Political Cycle Effect?
Since variations in returns have been associated with business cycle fluctuations and business cycle fluctuations have been associated with political variables, the heterogenous impact of the presidential partisan cycle on the government exposure portfolios might simply be due to business cycle fluctuations. For instance, Republican presidencies are associated with more severe recessions, while Democratic presidencies are associated with expansions, consistently with the summary statistics in Table 1. 12 Thus, different return sensitivities might explain the pattern observed in the data.
To distinguish the political cycle from the business cycle effect on stock returns, we run time-series portfolio returns predictability regressions of the form:
where R it+1 is the i th government exposure portfolio excess return, Dem t is a political dummy variable equal to one if the beggining of the month president is from the Democratic party, and X t is a vector containing lagged business cycle variables known to forecast stock returns.
Following Petkova and Zhang (2005), we consider the following business cycle variables: the dividend yield (DIV), the default spread (DEF), the term spread (TERM), and the shortterm Treasury bill rate (TB). The choice of these variables is standard from the time-series predictability literature. 13 Appendix A-2 provides a detailed description and data sources of these variables.
[Insert Table 6 Here] 
Expected versus Unexpected Returns
The previous analysis documents a difference in the realized excess returns of the government exposure portfolios across Republican and Democratic presidential terms, with this difference being considerably higher in industries with high exposure to government spending. In this section, we investigate whether the observed pattern in realized returns of the government exposure portfolios across presidential terms can be attributed to variation in expected returns (risk-premia) or unexpected returns. Difference in expected returns would be consistent with a risk story requiring firms with high government exposure to be riskier than firms with low government exposure during Democratic presidencies, with the reverse being true during Republican presidencies. In contrast, if the pattern in the government portfolios returns across presidencies is due to unexpected returns, it would suggests that the market is systematically surprised by the partisan policies concerning government spending. In contrast with the model-free stock return predictability analysis in Section 3.3.2, we now impose the structure of an asset pricing model to identify the time-series of expected and unexpected returns of the government exposure portfolios across presidential terms.
Return Decomposition
For tractability, we focus our analysis on the returns of the high minus low government exposure portfolio. We decompose the time-series of realized returns (R t ) of this portfolio into conditional expected returns (ER t ) and unexpected returns (U R t ). The unexpected returns are measured as the difference between the realized and the expected portfolio returns
To obtain the time-series of conditional expected returns of the high minus low government exposure portfolio, we estimate a conditional multifactor model which includes the market, SMB, HML, and the momentum factors, following the work of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) . The expected excess return conditional on time-t information set of the portfolio is thus given by the asset pricing model:
where λ it and β it are factor i = market, SMB, HML and momentum conditional risk premia and conditional portfolio beta, respectively. By allowing several risk factors in this specification, we maximize the ability of the asset pricing model to explain the time-series variation in the expected excess returns of the high minus low government exposure portfolio across presidential terms, thus minimizing the likelihood that omitted risk factors might severely affect our findings.
We follow Ferson and Harvey (1999) and Petkova and Zhang (2005) to compute the conditional risk premia of each factor and the portfolio conditional beta. We estimate condi-tional moments using the same business cycle variables used in the stock return predictability regressions in Section 3.3.2 as the conditioning variables. The estimated time-series of the factor i conditional risk premium (λ it ) is given by the fitted values of a regression of the realized factor i return (R it+1 ) on the conditioning variables:
Similarly, the time-series of the factor i conditional beta for the high minus low government exposure portfolio is computed by running a conditional regression:
where R t+1 is the realized excess return of the high minus low government exposure portfolio.
The estimated time-series of the factor i conditional beta is then given by:
The time-series of the conditional expected return for the high minus low government exposure portfolio is then obtained from equation (2) 
Expected and Unexpected Returns Across Presidencies
The first row in Table 7 reports the average realized, expected and unexpected returns of the high minus low government portfolio across Democratic and Republican presidencies, as well as the difference in the means (Dif) and corresponding Newey-West corrected p-value in parenthesis. The differences in the realized returns of the high and low government portfolios across presidencies cannot be explained by differences in their risk, as captured by standard risk factors. The average expected excess returns of the high minus low government portfolio during Republican presidencies is actually positive, albeit small, only 0.77% per annum. This positive value is in contrast with its negative average realized excess return of −4.78% per annum thus generating an even higher (in absolute value) unexpected excess return of −5.5%
per annum. During Democratic presidencies, the expected excess return of the high minus low government portfolio is positive 2.17% per annum, but this risk premium is too small to explain the observed average realized excess returns of 6.19% per annum. As a result, the unexpected return of the portfolio is large, 4.02% per annum.
[Insert Table 7 here]
Expected and Unexpected Returns Within Presidencies
We extend the previous analysis to investigate the differences in realized, expected and unexpected excess returns of the high minus low government portfolio within presidential terms. Since each presidential term is composed of four years, we examine, within Democratic and Republican presidencies, the average portfolio returns separately across the first year of the presidential term (Year 1), the second year (Year 2), the third year (Year 3) and the fourth (election) year (Year 4). If the difference in returns is due to a higher (lower) ex-ante risk premium across Democratic (Republican) presidencies, then the unexpected return should be more concentrated earlier on during the term of the presidency when political uncertainty is more likely to be resolved. Naturally, the statistical inference becomes more challenging as this subperiod analysis decreases the already small sample size. Nonetheless, rows (2) to (5) in Table 7 show interesting patterns in the portfolio returns within presidencies.
The realized low returns of the high minus low government exposure portfolio during
Republican presidencies are more concentrated in the first and second year of the presidential term, with −7.41% and −7.44% per annum, respectively. The realized high returns of this portfolio during Democratic presidencies are more concentrated in the second year and especially in the third year of the presidential term, with 10.05% and 17.13% per annum, respectively.
The risk pattern (expected returns) of the high minus low government exposure portfolio within presidencies cannot explain the observed pattern in average realized returns. As a result, the average unexpected returns of this portfolio are high. Despite the low sample size, the unexpected returns are in some cases statistically significant. During the second year of the Republican presidential terms, the average unexpected return of the high minus low government exposure portfolio is negative, −8.65% per annum, and statistically significant.
In contrast, during the third year of Democratic presidencies, the average unexpected return of the high minus low portfolio is positive, 15.11% per annum, and statistically significant.
Thus, firms with high exposure to government spending systematically underperform firms with low exposure in the second year of Republican presidencies, and outperform these firms in the third year of Democratic presidencies.
Taken together, the pattern in the unexpected returns of the government exposure portfolios reported here, suggests that the difference in the returns of the government exposure portfolios was not anticipated by the market. Thus, given the link between the government exposure portfolios and government spending, this result can be attributed to the market being systematically surprised by the partisan economic policies related to government spending.
Government Spending and Profitability Surprises Across Presidential Terms
The preceding analysis shows a statistically reliable and economically meaningful link between exposure to government spending and average stock returns across presidential partisan cycles. However, according to the standard Campbell and Shiller (1988) decomposition, we know that variation in returns should equal the sum of expected returns, shocks to cash flows, and shocks to discount rates. Thus, persistent differences in cash flow surprises across industries with different exposures to government spending could be responsible for our findings if these surprises are correlated with the presidential partisan cycle.
In this section we explore this issue following the methodology in Hou and Robinson (2006) . We examine whether the differences in the average returns of the government exposure portfolios over presidential terms are due to persistent, in-sample cash flow shocks.
Since these shocks may not persist in the future, a positive answer to this question would suggest that the observed differences in the average returns of the government exposure portfolios across presidential terms is unlikely to persist out-of-sample.
To identify the profitability shocks, we estimate the following profitability model at the firm level:
where E/A is earnings scaled by total assets, V/A is the ratio of market value of assets to book assets (a proxy for Tobin's Q), DD is a dummy variable for nondividend-paying firms, and D/B is the ratio of dividend payments to book equity. The inclusion of these variables follows from the work by Fama and French (2000) and Vuolteenaho (2002) . To estimate this model, we run Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of equation (6) in each year.
Expected profitability is the fitted value from this regression in which the coefficients are given by the time-series average of the estimated regression coefficients in each year. The realized profitability is given by E/A and unexpected profitability is the residual.
[Insert Table 8 here]
Panel A in Table 8 The results reported in Table 8 , Panel B, show that cash-flow shocks are consistent with our findings across Republican presidential terms, but not across Democratic ones. Across
Republican presidential terms (row 2), the coefficient on government exposure is negative and significant. Thus, firms more exposed to government spending have worse-than expected profitability relative to firms with low exposure. This result is consistent with the lower average returns of the high government exposure portfolios across Republican presidential terms, as reported in Table 4 , Panel B. During Democratic presidential terms, the government exposure slope coefficient is also negative, albeit not statistically significant. Thus, in-sample cash-flow shocks do not seem a plausible explanation for the observed higher average returns of the high government exposure portfolios. If anything, the negative government exposure slope makes the large positive spread in average returns of the government exposure portfolios during Democratic years even more puzzling.
To facilitate the comparison between the pattern of profitability shocks and the pattern in returns within presidential terms reported in Table 7 , we also compute the average realized, expected and unexpected profitability of the high minus low government exposure portfolio across presidential partisan cycles and across the four years of the presidential term. Panel C in Table 8 reports the results. To obtain the profitability measures at the portfolio level, we compute the value-weighted average of the firm level profitability components for both the high and low government exposure portfolios.
The results in Table 8 , Panel C, show that average realized profitability across all years (row 1) of the high minus low government exposure portfolio is always negative, regardless of the presidential partisan cycle. Thus, firms with high exposure to government spending are on average less profitable than firms with low government exposure, consistently with the portfolio summary statistics reported in Table 4 , Panel A. More importantly, the observed pattern in unexpected profitability across presidential terms cannot explain the pattern in the returns of the government exposure portfolios. During Democratic presidential terms, the unexpected profitability of the high minus low government exposure portfolio is negative, albeit not statistically significant, but the realized returns of this portfolio are strongly positive. During Republican presidential terms, the unexpected profitability of the high minus low government exposure portfolio is negative, consistently with the negative realized returns of this portfolio, though not statistically significant.
We now turn to the analysis of the pattern of unexpected profitability shocks within each presidential term (rows 2 to 5). Since the profitability measures are only available at annual frequency (and not at monthly frequency as the return data), the small sample size for this analysis makes the statistical inference even more challenging. During Democratic presidential terms, the high negative unexpected profitability of the high minus low government exposure portfolio during the third year of the presidential term is puzzling in light of the high positive realized and unexpected returns of this portfolio for the same period, as reported in Table 7 , row 4. During Republican presidential terms, the pattern of unexpected profitability of the high minus low portfolio is roughly consistent with the pattern of realized and unexpected returns observed in the data.
Taken together, the results in this section suggest that the pattern of unexpected profitability across presidential terms is a possible explanation for the pattern in returns (realized and unexpected) of the government exposure portfolios during Republican presidential terms, but not across Democratic ones. If anything, not only the negative abnormal profitability fails to account for our findings across Democratic presidencies, but it works in the opposite direction. This suggests that we might be understating the true relation between government exposure and expected returns during these periods.
Presidential Cycle Investment Strategy
The empirical link between the presidential partisan cycle, firms' exposure to government spending and stock returns suggests a natural investment strategy to explore the predictability pattern observed in the data. In this section, we examine the risk and return properties of a long-short self-financing investment strategy. During Democratic presidencies, the strategy is long on the portfolio of firms with high government exposure and short on the portfolio of firms with low government exposure. During Republican presidencies, the long and short positions are reversed. We refer to this investment strategy as the presidential cycle investment strategy.
Panel A in Table 9 reports the average annualized value-weighted excess returns and corresponding Sharpe ratio of the presidential cycle investment strategy. The average excess return is about 5.32%, with an annual Sharpe ratio of 0.4. These values are statistically and economically significant.
[Insert Table 9 here] Consistent with the results from the previous section, the large average excess returns of the presidential cycle investment strategy cannot be explained by exposure to standard risk factors. Panel B in Table 9 reports the asset pricing test results for the unconditional CAPM, Fama and French (1993) three-factor model, and Carhart (1997) four-factor model.
The results show that none of these three models can explain the large average excess returns of the presidential cycle investment strategy. According to the CAPM, the risk exposure of this investment strategy as measured by its market beta is basically nil. As a result, the CAPM alphas are large, almost identical to the raw average excess returns on the investment strategy, and statistically significant. The results of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model are qualitatively similar to the CAPM results. The momentum factor of the Carhart (1997) model decreases the magnitude of the alpha to 3.24% per annum, although this value is still significant at conventional levels.
Panel C in Table 9 reports the asset pricing test results for the conditional versions of the previous asset pricing models. We follow the same approach and use the same business cycle conditioning variables as explained in Section 4.1. Compared with the unconditional models, the size of the alpha increases substantially. The alpha of the presidential cycle investment strategy ranges from 5% for the conditional version of the Carhart (1997) model, to 6.9% per annum, for the conditional version of the Fama and French (1993) three-factor model.
Conclusion
We find strong correlations between industry exposure to government spending and the cross-section of average stock returns across presidential partisan cycles. The major stylized facts that we document are:
1. Firms in industries with high exposure to government spending outperform firms in industries with low exposure to government spending by about 6.2 percentage points during Democratic presidencies, but underperform during Republican presidencies by about -4.8 percentage points.
2. The presidential stock market puzzle in Santa-Clara and Valkanov (2003) 4. The pattern in returns of the government exposure portfolios is not concentrated around or after election years, when uncertainty regarding partisan economic policies related to government spending is likely to be resolved.
Taken together, these findings suggest that government spending represents an empirically plausible economic channel through which the presidential partisan cycle may affect stock returns.
The results in this paper raise several questions. What is the exact economic mechanism by which government spending affects stock prices in the cross-section? Why have investors not correctly anticipated differences in the partisan government spending policies into prices?
While we cannot provide a conclusive answer, we can conjecture as in Santa-Clara and
Valkanov (2003) that investors may perceive the party in the presidency to be only a noisy signal of government spending policies, or that given the small number of presidencies, it may have been rather difficult to identify systematic differences in government spending policies, or even simpler, we have the wrong model of expected returns.
Another possibility is that our findings might be simply the outcome of data mining. This is certainly a concern for the presidential party variable as other political variables including the party in control of the Senate or the House have been less successful. While we cannot rule out such a possibility, we can safely argue that, after all, our findings are based on an economically meaningful, hard measure of firms' exposure to the government.
Moreover, government spending is one of the most important policy variables, and as such should affect the economy.
14 Our results suggest a number of fruitful areas for future research. First and foremost, our empirical evidence suggests a need for asset-pricing models which explicitly incorporate the government sector and its related policies. Since the cross-sectional political cycle effects reported here build up throughout the presidential term, we conjecture that a model in which investors gradually learn about the partisan government spending policies, along the lines of Pastor and Veronesi (2010) , is likely to provide interesting insights. 
Input-Output Algebra
We then proceed as follows. Suppose there are I industries in the economy. Denote x ij as the output flow from industry i to industry j, and c i as the final use of output produced by industry i. The accounting identity implies that the total output x i of the industry i is
From the production side of the economy, x i is a function of all inputs of industry i.
Assuming that the production function is linear in the inputs (which can be interpreted as a first order approximation of a non-linear production function), we have:
where a ij is the Leontief coefficient. We can then plug equation (2) into (1), and obtain the following linear equation in matrix form:
where the element i, j of the matrix A is a ij. Rearranging terms and assuming that (I − A)
is invertible, we have
Note in equation (4) represents the total requirement of the additional production from industry i due to one unit of additional final uses of commodity j.
Multiply (I − A)
−1 by c and get the vector x, which is the total outputs required, directly or indirectly, by each industry to fulfill total government sector demand. In the final sample, we exclude firms/industries with missing measure of exposure to the government sector, due to missed matching. In addition, we also exclude firms in the financial(600 ≤3-digit SIC< 700) and utility sectors (490 ≤3-digit SIC≤ 494). To compute the government exposure breakpoints for the five government exposure portfolios, we compute the quintiles based on the industry level data at the Input-Output (IO) industry level, since this is the level of aggregation provided in the I-O tables.
A-2 Firm Characteristics and Financial Data
Following Fama and French (1993) , we define the book value of equity as the COMPUSTAT book value of common equity (CEQ) plus balance-sheet deferred taxes (TXDB) and investment tax credits (ITCB), minus book value of preferred stock. Depending on availability, we use the redemption (PSTKRV), liquidation (PSTKL), or carrying value of preferred stock (PSTK). When CEQ is unavailable, the liquidation value of common equity (CEQL) is used.
Size is defined as the stock price times shares outstanding at the end of June of year t from CRSP. Book to market is the ratio of book value of equity to the market value of equity, which is price times shares outstanding at the end of December of year t from CRSP. We match the CRSP monthly stock from July of year t to June of year t + 1 with the accounting data of fiscal year t − 1 from CRSP/COMPUSTAT Merged database.
The data for the three Fama-French factors (SMB, HML and Market excess returns), the Carhart (1997) momentum factor and the risk-free rate is from Prof. Kenneth French's webpage. The three factors are: (i) the Market excess return on a value-weighted portfolio of NYSE, AMEX, and Nasdaq stocks minus the T-bill rate; (ii) SMB which is the return on the Small-minus-Big portfolio; and (iii) HML, which is the return on the High-minus-Low portfolio. The SMB and HML portfolios are based on the six Fama-French benchmark port-folios sorted by size (breakpoint at the median) and book-to-market equity (breakpoints at the 30th and 70th percentiles). The SMB return is the difference in average returns between three small and three big stock portfolios. The HML return is the difference in average returns between two high and two low book-to-market portfolios. See Fama and French (1993) for a complete description of these factor returns. Momentum factor is constructed by forming six value-weight portfolios on size and prior (2-12) returns. The portfolios, which are formed monthly, are the intersections of 2 portfolios formed on size (market equity, ME) and 3 portfolios formed on prior (2-12) return. The monthly size breakpoint is the median NYSE market equity. The monthly prior (2-12) return breakpoints are the 30th and 70th NYSE percentiles. Momentum factor is the average return on the two high prior return portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios.
Following Petkova and Zhang (2005) Following Hou and Robinson (2006) , we define profitability E/A as COMPUSTAT earning before interest(interest before extraordinary items (IB)+interest expense (XINT)+income statement deferred tax (TXDI)) divided by total assets (AT). V/A is the ratio of market value of assets (market equity + total assets-book equity) to book assets. D/B is the ratio of dividends (DVC) to book equity. DD is a dummy variable for nondividend-paying firm (1 if DVC is zero, 0 otherwise). Panel A reports the time-series averages of median characteristics of five government exposure portfolios. Market Share is the average portfolio market share -across all firms in CRSP-, Firms is the average monthly number of firms in each portfolio, Industries is the average monthly number of three-SIC digit industries in each portfolio, GOV is the portfolio median level of industry exposure to government spending, Size is the median of (log) market capitalization of the firms in each portfolio , BM is the average of the median ratio of book-to-market equity of the firms in each portfolio and EA is the average of the firm level median earnings-to-asset ratio. This table reports the average and the corresponding Newey-West corrected p-value in parenthesis of the realized, expected and unexpected stock return of the high minus low government portfolio across the presidential cycle. The time-series of realized returns is the in-sample observed return of the high minus low government exposure portfolio, the time-series of expected Returns is obtained using the Fama and French (1993) conditional three factor model augmented with the Carhart (1997) momentum factor as the benchmark asset pricing model, and the time-series of unexpected returns is the difference between the realized and the conditional expected portfolio returns. The table reports where E/A is earnings-to-assets ratio, V/A is the ratio of market value of assets to book assets, DD is a dummy variable for nondividend-paying firms, and D/B is the ratio of dividend payments to book equity. Unexpected profitability is the regression residual, Expected profitability is the fitted value of the regression (whose coefficients equal the time-series averages of the slopes in each cross-sectional regression) and Realized profitability is given by the firm level E/A. Panel B reports the results from Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of firm-level unexpected profitability on the firm-level exposure to government spending (Gov) measured at the three-digit SIC level, across Democratic and Republican presidencies. Panel C reports the average and the corresponding Newey-West corrected p-value in parenthesis of the realized, expected and unexpected profitability for the high minus low government exposure portfolio across Democratic (Dem) and Republican ( The figure plots the average annualized value-weighted excess returns across presidential terms of the high minus low government exposure spread portfolio. The sample data are monthly from July 1955 to December 2009.
